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  This paper analyzes the fixed-mobile convergence (FMC) service as a two-sided 
market. A two-sided market is defined as a market in which one or several platforms 
enable interactions between end-users and try to get the two sides “on board” by 
appropriately charging each side (Rochet and Tirole 2003, Armstrong 2006). Consider a 
platform that requires per-interaction charges (aA and aB) from both sides. The market is 
one-sided if volume V of transactions realized on the platform depends only on the 
aggregate price level: 
 a = aA + aB, 
i.e., V is insensitive to reallocations of the total price a between the two sides. If, in 
contrast, V varies with aA while a remains constant, the market is said to be two-sided 
(Rochet and Tirole 2006 pp. 645-648). 
  One example of a two-sided market is a credit card: for a given set of charges, a 
consumer is more likely to use a credit card that is widely accepted by retailers, while a 
retailer is more likely to accept a card that is carried by many consumers. See Rochet 




  Japan’s fixed-line Internet and third generation (3G) mobile phone services have 
developed rapidly, blazing a trail for others in the world to follow (Ida 2009). As of 
March 2009, the number of subscriptions to fixed-line Internet (broadband) services 
was 30 million (household penetration rate of about 50%), broken down as fiber to the 
home (FTTH) service (50%), asymmetric digital subscriber line (ADSL) service (37%), 
and cable modem (CATV) Internet service (14%). An analysis of the market share of 
Internet providers shows that NTT gained 36% and 74% in the ADSL and FTTH 
markets, respectively. On the other hand, the number of contracts for mobile phones in 
Japan had reached 120 million by March 2009, and the mobile Internet penetration rate 
is almost 90%. Note that 3G users now overwhelmingly exceed 2G users. The market 
share figures for mobile phone providers are 49% for NTT, 28% for KDDI, and 18% for 
Softbank. 
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  At this moment, FMC service, which is expected to spread extensively in the near 
future (Curwen 2006), can be classified into the following three categories: 
 One charge system: Customers benefit from discounted one-stop billing services. 
 One handset (or equipment): Customers can make telephone calls with one 
telephone and one number. 
 One network: Providers can provide enhanced services with one database and one 
seamless network. 
  From top to bottom, consumers enjoy increased value addition, whereas providers 
have to shoulder the burden of increased development costs. Note that the most 
enhanced FMC service assumes advanced customers will use both services; only NTT, 
KDDI, and Softbank can provide both FTTH and 3G services. The NTT group’s 
services have the largest market shares in both the FTTH and 3G markets, raising 
serious concerns for promoting effective competition. For example, in June 2008, the 
NTT group started to provide a new FMC service called “Home U” that uses a new 
handset called “Onefone”; this service can be used for both mobile phones and wireless 
LANs and allows users to freely use their mobile Internet service at home if they pay a 
monthly fee of JPY 1,029 (US$ 10)1. 
  Consider FMC service as a two-sided market. In two-sided markets, there are two 
different types of users at both ends of a common platform. For FMC service, the 
platform provider is a telecommunications carrier that supplies both fixed-line Internet 
and mobile phone services. The carrier sets its price structure, which comprises 
fixed-line Internet and mobile phone prices, to maximize joint profit. Because of 
indirect network effects, an increase in fixed-line Internet users increases mobile phone 
users on the same platform through an increase in the number of partners and the variety 
of FMC services. The reverse is also true. In Japan, the following carriers provide both 
fixed-line Internet and mobile phone services: NTT, KDDI, and Softbank. They 
oligopolistically compete by considering the two-sidedness of FMC service2. 
                                                 
1British Telecom (BT) started an FMC service called “BT Fusion” in June 2005. This 
service made it possible to use one handset as an IP phone at home (via Bluetooth or 
Wi-Fi) and as a mobile phone outdoors. 
2Previous studies have pointed out that fixed-line and mobile phone services are 
two-sided. “Interestingly, even mobile and fixed telephone services, for which most 
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  The following is a summary of our study’s main aims and conclusions. We analyze 
the price structures of fixed-line Internet and mobile phone services for subscribers to 
both services. Even though the Japanese FMC service is relatively new, we assume that 
the carriers determine their profit-maximizing price structures by considering its 
two-sidedness. We propose a model where indirect network effects exist between the 
fixed-line Internet and mobile phone users and where FMC carriers are oligopolistically 
competing in a differentiated Bertrand fashion. We estimate the price parameters and the 
network effect parameters using data that we collected in a consumer survey that was 
jointly conducted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) and 
Kyoto University in March 2009. Based on our estimates, we calculate the equilibrium 
margins for fixed-line Internet and mobile phone services and discuss firms’ strategies 
and competition policies for future FMC service.  
  At this point, we should explain the network effect in a two-sided market. Users 
enjoy more telecommunications conversations at reduced rates and benefit from more 
diverse content by integrating the brands of fixed-line Internet and mobile phone 
services. However, FMC continues to develop, and the network effects of FMC service 
are expected to grow due to such improvements. Therefore, consumer preferences are 
dynamically changing, and this research is a tentative estimation based on current 
preferences.  
  Note that not all fixed-line users subscribe to the same brand of mobile phone service, 
and not all mobile phone users subscribe to the same brand of fixed-line service. 
Therefore, the equilibrium consumer surplus and profits depend on the price structures 
determined by the platform carriers. 
  When considering FMC service as a two-sided market, we observe that 270 users 
(43%) out of the total number of NTT users (622 users) subscribed to fixed-line Internet 
and mobile phone services of the same brand, but the remaining 352 users (57%) 
subscribed to different brands. Similarly, 88% of KDDI and 81% of Softbank users did 
                                                                                                                                               
users are both callers and receivers, should be treated as two-sided markets. A high 
termination charge raises the marginal cost of calls and lowers the marginal cost of call 
receptions. In other words, the termination charge is an instrument of 
cross-subsidization similar to the interchange fee in credit card markets” (Rochet and 
Tirole, 2003, p.1018). 
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not integrate brands. Therefore, most users do not integrate two brands at both ends of a 
platform, and the platform carriers cannot completely internalize the network effects by 
charging two-ended users. This is the reason we consider FMC service a two-sided 
market. 
  Two main conclusions are obtained in this paper. First, network effects and 
two-sidedness exist between fixed-line Internet and mobile phone services. In other 
words, an increase in market share on one side increases the market share on the other 
side of the same platform. Across different platforms, in contrast, an increase in market 
share on one side decreases the market share on the other side. Second, we calculated 
the equilibrium price structure given this two-sidedness. For NTT, whose services have 
the largest market shares in both markets, the margin is set higher in the former market 
and lower in the latter. NTT profits by subsidizing its relatively disadvantageous market 
using its relatively advantageous market. Softbank subsidizes its mobile phone services 
with fixed-line Internet, and KDDI does the opposite. 
  This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the survey method and data. 
Section 3 proposes a generic model of a two-sided market according to Argentesi and 
Filistrucchi (2007), and Section 4 explains a suitable estimation model for the 
two-sidedness between fixed-line Internet (broadband) and mobile phone services. Then, 
Section 5 demonstrates the estimation results, and Section 6 provides optimal price 
structures and discusses the various implications of strategies and policies. Section 7 
contains our concluding remarks. 
 
2. Survey Method and Data 
 
  In March 2009, in a joint effort with MIC, we conducted a sample survey on the 
individual usage of telecommunications services. Random surveys were conducted on 
monitors registered with a consumer monitor investigation company. We identified 786 
individuals currently using both fixed-line Internet and mobile phone services. The 
survey included such socio-demographics as gender, age, occupation, and household 
income (Table 2). While carrying out this random sampling, we carefully considered 





  The breakdowns are given in Table 3 based on fixed-line Internet (broadband) usage. 
The selection ratios are 39% for ADSL and 61% for FTTH 3. NTT’s market share is 
36% for ADSL and 82% for FTTH. The current major Internet usages are indicated in 
Table 4. The 050-type IP phone (whose service qualities such as voice clearness are not 
guaranteed) are popular among ADSL users (38%), and the 0ABJ-type IP phone (whose 
qualities of service are guaranteed) are rather popular in FTTH (10%). There is no 
significant difference between ADSL and FTTH with regard to free or paid downloads 





  The details of mobile phone usage are given in Table 54. The selection ratios are 9% 
for 2G and 91% for 3G. This means that mobile-phone migration from 2G to 3G has 
almost finished in Japan. Market shares are 49% for NTT, 25% for KDDI, and 25% for 
Softbank. The current major function usages are indicated in Table 6. Note that overall, 
from basic services (e.g., sending/receiving e-mail and browsing the Web) to advanced 
services (e.g., viewing movies and carrying out financial transactions), the service 





                                                 
3To focus on the three carriers (NTT, KDDI, and Softbank) that provide fixed-line 
Internet and mobile phone services, we dropped CATV Internet users from the samples. 
This assumption can be partly rationalized by the independently and identically 
distributed (IID) assumption described later on in this paper. 
4Note that KDDI’s market share is smaller than the actual figure. This is because initial 
KDDI users did not notice that they were already 3G users. We did not correct the data 
because the 2G market share was so small that we could simply ignore the influence. 
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3. Theoretical Models 
 
  Following Rochet and Tirole (2003) and Armstrong (2006), many theoretical models 
of two-sided markets have been proposed. Table 7 summarizes these developments. We 
adopted a generic model of a two-sided market that was initially proposed by Argentesi 
and Filistrucchi (2007). Assume that multiple platforms compete in a differentiated 
Bertrand fashion. Each group values the size (number, share, variety, and so on) of the 




  Assume NF users in the fixed-line Internet market; it is given that the utility of 
subscribing to carrier i (i = 1,2,…,n) linearly increases with the number of mobile phone 
users of the same platform (Ni
M) and decreases its price (pi). Allowing for other 








F ), the utility 
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F . The model considers that the 




F ) depends positively on the scale (and potentially the 
variety) of mobile phone markets on the same platform (Ni
M ). The converse holds true 





  Turning to the supply side, we derive the pricing equation under the hypothesis that 




M ) = (pi
F − ci
F )yi
F (PF ,Y M (PM )) + (pi
M − ci
M )yi
M (PM ,Y F (PF )) , 
where pi
F  is the price of fixed-line Internet i and yi
F  is its demand, which depends on 
the vector of fixed-line Internet prices (PF = (p1
F , p2
F ,..., p n
F ) ) and on the vector of 
mobile phone demands (Y M = (y1
M , y2
M ,..., y n
M ) ), which in turn depend on the mobile 
phone prices (PM = (p1
M , p2
M ,..., p n
M )) . For mobile phones, pi
M  is the price of mobile 
phone service i, and yi
M  is the corresponding demand, which depends on the vectors of 
mobile phone prices ( PM ) and fixed-line Internet demands (Y F = (y1
F , y2
F ,..., y n
F ) ), 
which in turn depend on the fixed-line Internet prices (PF ) . Under the assumption of 
constant marginal costs, ci
F  and ci
M  are the marginal costs of the fixed-line Internet 
and mobile phone services, respectively. 
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  Each carrier providing an FMC platform chooses a fixed-line Internet price (pi
F )  
and a mobile phone price (pi
M )  to maximize their total profit (Πi ), taking other firms’ 
prices ( p j
F , p j
M ) as given. For each carrier i, there are two first-order conditions (FOC): 
 
• FOC for the fixed-line Internet margin is derived from the total profit 
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• FOC for the mobile phone margin is derived from the total profit maximization 
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  The price-cost margin is lower in two-sided markets than in one-sided markets 
because of the network effect between the fixed-line Internet and mobile phone services. 
This network effect is captured by the last two terms on the right-hand side. The first 
term expresses that a price increase decreases its own demand, thus decreasing the 
mobile phone demand on the same platform ( ∂yi
M / ∂yi
F ). The second term represents 
the competition effect: a price increase for fixed-line Internet i increases the demand for 
a rival service ( ∂y j
F / ∂pi
F ) and has a negative effect on its mobile phone demand 
( ∂yi
M / ∂y j
F ). The margin ( pi
F − ci
F ) can be computed on the basis of the estimated 
parameters of the logit models described below. The same can be said of the mobile 




4. Estimation Models 
 
  Several important empirical papers analyzing two-sided markets have recently been 
published (Table 8). Next, we explain an estimation model that measures the 





  Among the Japanese telecommunications carriers, the NTT group extensively 
provides fixed-line Internet services, including FTTH, and mobile phone services, 
including 3G. In this respect, the NTT group can raise its competitiveness by registering 
more users to both services. That is, users who subscribe to NTT’s broadband services 
are more likely to subscribe to NTT’s mobile phone services. Users who subscribe to 
NTT’s mobile phone services are also more likely to subscribe to NTT’s broadband 
services. The same thing applies to KDDI and Softbank, except that when compared 
with NTT, their shares are much smaller in both markets. 
  Next, we consider a simultaneous-equation model and address the problem of 
endogeneity across those equations. The full-information maximum likelihood (FIML) 
method, which jointly treats all equations and all parameters, is the most efficient 
among the estimators. However, since the FIML estimator requires immense 
computations, it is often difficult to perform. Instead, the limited-information maximum 
likelihood (LIML) method can be considered. We used the two-stage logit estimation 
method that consists of the following procedure (Maddala 1983). First, we separately 
estimated the reduced-form equations via the logit model, using all exogenous variables 
such as monthly fixed prices. Second, we estimated the structural-form equations via 
the logit model and inserted expected choice probabilities as instrumental variables into 
the model. 
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M  denotes the discrete choice of subscribing to mobile phone service i. 1 {-} is an 
















M  are monthly fixed prices, which we 
assume to be predetermined for individuals;  α
kl  and  β
kl  are parameters to be 








M  are IID extreme value (EV) random terms. 
  The structural-form equations are indicated as follows5: 
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M  denotes the expected choice 
probability of subscribing to the mobile phone service of identical carrier i and 





denotes the market share of the mobile phone service of carrier i and measures the 








F .  γ
F and  γ
M  are parameters that represent the network effects if users 
subscribe to both the fixed-line Internet and mobile phone services provided by 
identical carrier i. 
 
5. Estimation Results 
 
  In this section, we demonstrate the estimation results and calculate the marginal 
effects. We adopted the two-stage logit estimation method that was explained in the 
previous section. The explained variables are the Japanese telecommunications carriers 
that provide both fixed-line Internet and mobile phone services: NTT, Softbank, and 
KDDI. Table 9 summarizes the basic statistics of the sample used for our analysis. The 
market shares of the fixed-line Internet service are NTT (64%), Softbank (25%), and 
KDDI (10%). Note that 78% of NTT’s fixed-line Internet users subscribe to the FTTH 
service. On the other hand, almost all of Softbank’s fixed-line Internet users subscribe to 
ADSL, and all KDDI users subscribe to FTTH. The mobile phone shares are 49% for 
NTT and 25% for KDDI and Softbank. These numbers are actually different from the 
real figures (KDDI 30% and Softbank 20%) because we focused on the users who 
subscribe to both services and excluded all others. Many KDDI users are young and 
actively download music/movie data via mobile Internet and do not use fixed-line 
Internet at home. 
 
                                                                                                                                               




  The prices are the cheapest for Softbank in both fixed-line Internet and mobile phone 
services, which is consistent with our expectation that Softbank has gained market 
shares with its inexpensive introductory prices. Interestingly, the prices are highest for 
KDDI for both services, perhaps because its fixed-line Internet users subscribe to the 
expensive FTTH service and its mobile users download expensive data. 
  Users who integrate both fixed-line Internet and mobile phone brands are the most 
likely to use advanced FMC services: their ratio to the total users is 34% for NTT, 8% 
for Softbank, and 4% for KDDI. NTT users are the most promising candidates for FMC 
services. In this respect, NTT will increasingly enjoy an advantage over its competitors 
as FMC service spreads.  
  Based on the estimates of monthly fixed prices and network effects, we calculated 
their marginal effects. Then, based on those marginal effect values, we can draw the 
equilibrium margins for fixed-line Internet and mobile phone services. We can also 
control for other individual characteristics such as age, gender, household income, 
family composition, Internet usage (ADSL subscription, music download, movie 
streaming, IP phone, on-line games, on-line shopping, on-line banking, blogs, etc.), and 
mobile phone usages (3G subscription, picture download, movie streaming, game 
applications, e-books, GPS, international roaming, etc.). 
  Let us examine the estimation results of fixed-lined Internet service (Table 10). As 
expected, the monthly fixed price of fixed-line Internet service negatively influences the 
choice probability of fixed-line Internet service with 1% significance, and a network 
effect exists from mobile phones to fixed-line Internet with 1% significance. 
Furthermore, among control variables, the following are statistically significant: NTT’s 
user ages, NTT’s ADSL dummy, NTT’s on-line shopping, and Softbank’s IP phone6. 
  Next, we turn to the estimation results of mobile phone services. As expected, their 
monthly fixed price negatively influences the choice probability of mobile phone 
carriers with 1% significance, and a network effect exists from fixed-line Internet to 
mobile phones with 1% significance. Furthermore, among control variables, the 
                                                 
6Estimates of individual characteristics represent the incremental utility of choosing 
NTT or Softbank based on KDDI’s utility. 
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following are statistically significant: NTT’s mobile music download, NTT’s GPS, 




  On the basis of the estimates for the monthly fixed prices and network effects, the 
marginal effects can be calculated (Table 11)7. For fixed-line Internet, an increase in 
NTT’s fixed-line Internet price decreases its choice probability by 0.000041. This is its 
own marginal effect of choice probability with its fixed-line Internet price. Increases in 
Softbank’s and KDDI’s fixed-line Internet prices increase the choice probabilities of 
NTT’s fixed-line Internet service by 0.000027 and 0.000014, respectively. They are the 
cross marginal effects of the choice probabilities of NTT’s fixed-line Internet service 
with Softbank and KDDI’s fixed-line Internet prices.  
  For mobile phone network effects, an increase in NTT’s mobile phone share increases 
the choice probability of NTT’s fixed-line Internet by 0.68. This is its own marginal 
effect of the choice probability of NTT’s fixed-line Internet with its mobile phone share. 
Increases in Softbank’s and KDDI’s mobile phone shares decrease the choice 
probabilities of NTT’s fixed-line Internet service by 0.45 and 0.23, respectively. They 
are the cross marginal effects of the choice probabilities of NTT’s fixed-line Internet 





  We summarize the main points as follows. 
 
FINDING 1: Network Effects 
An important feature of two-sided markets is the network effect. We expectedly see 
that network effects exist between fixed-line Internet and mobile phone markets. 
An increase in one market share increases the other market share on the same 
platform. On the other hand, an increase in one market share decreases the other 
                                                 
7The values of marginal effects are ordinarily very small and are multiplied by 100. 
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market share across different platforms. 
 
  It is interesting to examine how network effects vary across platforms (NTT, 
Softbank, and KDDI). The own marginal effects of the network effects from mobile 
phone to fixed-line Internet are 0.69, 0.59, and 0.37 for NTT, Softbank, and KDDI, 
respectively. The own marginal effects of the network effects from fixed-line Internet to 
mobile phone are 0.28, 0.22, and 0.22 for NTT, Softbank, and KDDI, respectively. 
NTT’s figures are the highest in both cases. This implies that NTT can easily gain 
market share via bidirectional network effects since it has the largest market shares in 
both the fixed-line Internet and mobile phone markets. Softbank benefits from 
reasonable network effects that do not compare with those of NTT8. KDDI’s market 
share in fixed-line Internet is so small that its network effect from mobile phone to 
fixed-line Internet is not effective. When these carriers try to lock-in users by enriching 




  The economics of two-sided markets differ from those of one-sided markets in the 
following respects (Evans 2003). First, any change in demand or cost on one market 
will affect the price structure and the total price. Furthermore, there is no necessary 
relationship between price and marginal cost on either side. In fact, the price on one side 
could be above marginal cost, while the price on the other side could be below. 
  Considering FMC service as a two-sided market, we calculated the equilibrium price 
structures. The margin of a two-sided market can be divided into two parts: its own 
price effect term and the network effect term, the latter of which is the multiplication of 
the margin on the other market and the network effect parameter. Since the network 
effect coefficient is negative, a carrier decreases its price by the network effect term. 
The calculated equilibrium margins are indicated in Table 12. 
 
<Table 12> 
                                                 
8Note that most Softbank fixed-line Internet users subscribe to ADSL, and therefore 
Softbank’s network effects will decrease as migration from ADSL to FTTH advances. 
 14 
 
  The equilibrium margin of fixed-line Internet service is calculated as follows: JPY 
15,671 (US$ 157) (NTT’s fixed-line Internet share divided by its own marginal effect of 
price) minus JPY 435 (US$ 4) (NTT’s mobile phone margin, JPY 1,027 (US$ 10), 
multiplied by the network effect parameter, –0.4235) equals JPY 15,236 (US$ 152). The 
network effect term is so small that the difference in price is rather small if we consider 
the two-sidedness. The equilibrium margin of mobile phone service is calculated as 
follows: JPY 13,297 (US$ 133) (NTT’s mobile phone share divided by its own marginal 
effect of price) minus JPY 12,270 (US$ 123) (NTT’s fixed-line Internet margin, JPY 
15,236 (US$ 152), multiplied by the network effect parameter, -0.8053) equals JPY 
1,027 (US$ 10). The network effect term is so large that the difference in price is huge if 
we consider the two-sidedness. 
  The following is the reason for such stark price differences. The network effect 
parameter from fixed-line Internet to mobile phone is small, while the margin is small 
for a mobile phone user; therefore, it is less profitable to gain fixed-line Internet users 
by decreasing the price. Conversely, the network effect parameter from mobile phone to 
fixed-line Internet is large, while the margin is large for fixed-line Internet users; 
therefore, it is very profitable to gain mobile phone users by decreasing the price. This 
divergence between the fixed-line Internet and mobile phone margins results from the 
two-sidedness of FMC service. 
  As for Softbank and KDDI, the equilibrium margins reflect their advantages and 
disadvantages. Softbank’s margin is higher for fixed-line Internet (JPY 6,167, US$ 62) 
than for mobile phones (JPY 3,077, US$ 31), and KDDI’s margin is lower for fixed-line 
Internet (JPY 2,180, US$ 22) than for mobile phones (JPY 7,552, US$ 76). 
  We summarize the main points as follows. 
 
FINDING 2: Price Structures 
Price structures reflect network effects in two-sided markets. Since NTT has the 
largest market shares in both the fixed-line Internet (especially FTTH) and mobile 
phone markets, NTT strategically sets its margin higher in the fixed-line Internet 
market and sets its margin lower in the mobile phone market to maximize its total 
profit by subsidizing the relatively disadvantageous market (mobile phones) with 
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the relatively advantageous market (fixed-line Internet). Similarly, Softbank 
subsidizes its mobile phone markets with fixed-line Internet, and KDDI subsidizes 
its fixed-line Internet with mobile phones. 
 
  We will now supplement the above finding in some respects. First, the calculated 
price structures are very different from the actual observed price structures. The actual 
price-cost margin levels of fixed-line Internet and mobile phones are much lower than 
those calculated from the estimation results, and thus the carriers do not significantly 
subsidize the relatively disadvantageous markets with the relatively advantageous 
markets. Although deregulation has steadily progressed in the telecommunications 
industry, a bottleneck monopoly remains in subscriber access lines. Therefore, NTT is 
strictly regulated to open its essential facilities (including optical fiber) to competitors, 
and it cannot freely set profit-maximizing prices by considering two-sidedness. Next, to 
promote competition in the telecommunications industry, NTT is structurally unbundled 
under the holding company system and is prohibited from doing business jointly within 
group companies; it cannot freely set a profit-maximizing price structure by considering 
two-sidedness (e.g., between fixed-line Internet and mobile phone services). Last, 
broadband services, particularly FTTH, are still expanding, and each carrier is adopting 
introductory pricing by lowering its margins. 
  Second, as stated above, the carriers cannot freely set their price structures by 
considering two-sidedness due to Japan’s strict competition policy, but we expect that 
radical changes in price structure will occur if the carriers are allowed to freely set 
prices. NTT will raise its price-cost margin in the relatively advantageous fixed-line 
Internet market (up to JPY 15,236, US$ 152) and lower it in the relatively 
disadvantageous mobile phone market (to JPY 1,027, US$ 10); the total price-cost 
margin level becomes JPY 16,263 (US$ 163), which is very high compared with the 
price-cost margins of its competitors. NTT, which has an overwhelming market share in 
the fixed-line Internet market, has a great advantage over Softbank and KDDI. NTT’s 
dominance is expected to increase in the future because of the network effects of 
two-sidedness. 
  In summary, it is difficult for other carriers to compete effectively with NTT by 
supplying two-sided FMC services. In order to promote competition, the government 
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should limit NTT’s provision of FMC services and require it to unbundle an efficient 




  FMC services, which are based on the most advanced fixed-line and wireless 
networks in the world, are expected to spread extensively in Japan. This paper analyzed 
the two-sidedness of FMC service based on consumer-revealed preference data. NTT, 
Softbank, and KDDI are the major providers of FMC services. In this paper, we 
assumed that carriers compete à la Bertrand-Nash and estimated the prices and network 
effect parameters. We then substituted these estimates into the equilibrium price 
structures of two-sided FMC services. 
  However, many unsolved problems remain. First, although FMC services are 
characterized by their two-sidedness, they are still being diffused. We must investigate 
these features in more detail. We anticipated the future price structures of FMC services 
on the basis of the current fixed-line Internet and mobile phone demand systems. 
Second, we assumed that the competition model operated à la Bertrand-Nash and 
scrutinized the equilibrium price structures. Naturally, our results are dependent on 
these assumptions, and we should examine the model settings to check the robustness of 
our results. Third, we investigated the price structures of fixed-line Internet and mobile 
phones, but consumer preferences are rapidly changing, which is reflected in the 
development of FMC services. We must carefully continue to track such changing 
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Table 1: Examples of two-sided markets 
 
 
Product Subsidized segment Subsidizing segment
Video games Consumers (consoles) Software developers
Operating systems Applications developers Clients
Newspapers Readers Advertisers
Credit cards Cash holders Merchants
 (Legacy) Internet Web sites Dial up consumers
 (a) Software industries
 (b) Portals and media  industries
 (c) Payment system  industries









20s and uner 30s 40s 50s and over












Ratio 15.8% 57.9% 7.8% 1.5% 9.3% 6.3% 1.0%
(d) Annual household income class
JPY1M< JPY1-3M JPY3-5M JPY5-7M JPY7-10M JPY10-15M <JPY15M




Table 3  Fixed-line Internet market share
(a) Type of Internet access line
ADSL FTTH
Ratio 38.7% 61.3%
(b) ADSL market share
NTT KDDI Softbank
Ratio 36.2% 0.0% 63.8%
(c) FTTH market share
NTT KDDI Softbank


















Ratio 95.4% 67.4% 37.5% 2.6% 45.7% 18.1% 82.2% 69.1%


















Ratio 97.3% 66.0% 15.4% 10.0% 46.6% 13.3% 80.1% 68.2%




Ratio 25.8% 7.9% 40.5% 2.9% 2.3% 0.0%
(a) ADSL Internet usage (multiple answers)









Ratio 21.7% 44.9% 33.3%
NTT KDDI Softbank
Ratio 51.9% 23.6% 24.5%
(c) 2G market share
(d) 3G market share
Table 5:  Mobile phone market share
(a) Type of providers








Camera Watch Picture data Music data Game TV/Radio
Ratio 74% 25% 46% 62% 7% 88% 6% 12%











Camera Watch Picture data Music data Game TV/Radio
Ratio 89% 53% 63% 66% 29% 80% 20% 26%







Ratio 10% 9% 19% 34% 28% 4% 13% 0%
Table 6: Mobile phone usage
(a) 2G usage (multiple answers)
(ｂ) 3G usage (multiple answers)
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Which is better in two-sided markets,
compatibility or multihoming?
Multihoming weakens competition and




What is the pricing and commitment in
two-sided markets when platforms are
essential bottleneck inputs?
A monopoly platform prefers not to commit
to a price when it announces the price if it
faces unfavorable seller expectations.
Guthrie and Wright
(2007)
How does competition between identical
schemes affect the choice of fee structure in
two-sided markets?
While competition between schemes lowers
equilibrium interchange fees, competition
between merchants increases them.
Armstrong and Wright
(2007)
What happens in two-sided markets when
platforms are viewed homogenously by
sellers but heterogeneously by buyers?
Platforms do not compete directly for
sellers and instead choose to compete
indirectly by subsidizing buyers to join.
Kind, Koethenbuerger,
and Schjelderup (2008)
What is the efficient provision and optimal
taxes of goods in two-sided markets?
Imposing negative value-added taxes or




Why are price markups frequently much
higher on one side than the other?
The most elastic side of the market
generates maximum demand by providing
it with platform services at the lowest price.
Rochet and Tirole
(2008)
What is a tying-in in two-sided markets in
payment card associations through the so-
called honor-all-cards (HFC) rule?
The HFC rule not only benefits the multi-
card platform but also raises social welfare
due to a rebalancing effect.
Ambrus and Argenziano
(2009)
How much is externality valued in multiple
asymmetric networks?
One network is cheaper and larger on one
side, while the other network is cheaper and
larger on the other side.
Belleflamme and
Toulemonde (2009)
What happens if agents value the presence
of the agents of the other type but
negatively value the presence of the agents
of their own type?
A new platform cannot be subsidized to
divert agents from the existing platform if




How do differentiated platforms compete in
advertising levels and offer consumers a
free service that is financed through
advertising?
Advertising exhibits the properties of a
strategic substitute or complement, and
platform profit increases with market entry.
Ellman and Germano
(2009)
How do newspapers sell news to readers
who value accuracy and sell space to
advertisers who value advert-receptive
readers?
Monopolistic newspapers under-report
news that sufficiently reduces advertiser
profits; increasing the size of advertising




Does a platform attract firms selling
differentiated products and buyers
interested in those products?
When product differentiation raises the
value of the platform for the consumers but
weakens competition, the platform raises
both charges to consumers and fees for
firms.
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Yellow Pages in America
Advertisers value consumer usage while
consumers value advertising, implying that




payment card industry in
America
A regional correlation exists between
consumer usage and merchant acceptance
within the four major networks (Visa,
MasterCard, American Express, and







Magazines have properties of two-sided
markets, implying that higher demand on the
reader side increases ad rates, but higher





newspaper industry in Italy
A comparison between the estimated markups
and the observed markups shows evidence of
joint profit maximization on the newspaper
cover price, but the advertising market is
closer to competition.
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Table 9: Basic statistics 
 
 
NTT Softbank KDDI Total
User number of fixed-line Internet 505 199 82 786
User number of mobile phone 387 199 200 786
Monthly basic price: Fixed-line (JPY) 4134.2 4113.1 5056.8 4239.7
Monthly basic price: Mobile phone (JPY) 2725.6 2107.9 3424.2 2573.8
User number of ADSL 110 194 0 304
Carrier brand integrating users 270 64 30 364
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Variable Estimates t value
Fixed-line Price -0.00023 -4.122 ***
Mobile Network Effects 3.95510 4.050 ***
NTT ADSL -2.17973 -11.402 ***
NTT AGE 0.02122 2.636 ***
NTT SHOPPING 0.52433 1.724 *
SB IPPHONE 1.01601 3.245 ***




Variable Estimates t value
Mobile Price -0.00015 -4.200 ***
Fixed-line Network Effects 1.17350 5.226 ***
NTT Music -0.54355 -2.220 ***
NTT GPS -0.43926 -1.726 *
SB Music -0.70770 -2.370 **
SB GPS -0.75960 -2.388 **





















-.0041 *** .0027 ** .0014 ** 68.8940 *** -45.4297 ** -23.46433 **
SB Fixed-line
Marginal Effects
.0027 ** -.0035 ** .0008 -45.4297 ** 58.8485 ** -13.4188  **
KDDI Fixed-line
Marginal Effects
.0014 ** .0008 -.0022 * -23.4643 ** -13.4188 36.8830 *















-0.0037 *** 0.0018 *** 0.0018 *** 28.237 *** -14.0982 *** -14.1388 ***
SBMobile
Marginal Effects
0.0018 *** -0.0029 *** 0.001 ** -14.0982 *** 22.0079 *** -7.9097 ***
KDDI Mobile
Marginal Effects
0.0018 *** 0.001 ** -0.0029 *** -14.1388 *** -7.9097 *** 22.0485 ***
Note:  All figures multipied by 100. *** 1% significance, ** 5% significance, * 10% significance
(a) Fixed-line Internet Marginal Effects
(b) Mobile Phone Marginal Effects
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(a) Markup of Fixed-line Internet
Price Effect Mobile Markup Network Effect Markup
NTT 15,671 + 1,027 * -0.4235 = 15,236
Softbank 7,234 + 3,077 * -0.3469 = 6,167
KDDI 4,742 + 7,552 * -0.3392 = 2,180
Note: Figures represented by JPY
(b) Markup of Mobile Phone
Price Effect Fixed-line Markup Network Effect Markup
NTT 13,297 + 15,236 * -0.8053 = 1,027
Softbank 8,730 + 6,167 * -0.9167 = 3,077
KDDI 8,774 + 2,180 * -0.5607 = 7,552
Note: Figures represented by JPY
